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Abstract
Purpose – This paper examines how a public sector organization combined management control systems
(MCS) to comply with increased uncertainty and conflicting objectives of tight budget control, flexibility, and
quality care simultaneously. It also analyzes how middle managers interpret management control intentions
and manage conflicting objectives, and how locally developed MCS are coupled with top management goals.
Design/methodology/approach –This paper uses a case-study approach, based on interviewswith top and
middle managements, as well as document studies conducted at a medium-sized Danish municipality.
Findings – Both constraining and enabling control systems empower middle managers and facilitate tight
budget controls. Furthermore, middle managers play a crucial role in the use of MCS, develop local control
systems, adjust existing control systems and influence the decisions and strategies of top management.
Research limitations/implications – This paper is context-specific, and the role of accounting in
professional work varies due to the specific techniques involved.
Practical implications – This paper shows how MCS, including budgeting and planning systems, can be
applied in social services to help middle managements obtain tight budget controls while also improving
service quality.
Originality/value – This paper adds to the limited extant research on the role of middle management in a
control framework and demonstrates how MCS can balance conflicting goals in social services when
uncertainty increases. Furthermore, this paper shows how the vertical coupling of MCS is tight when
budgeting is employed for planning purposes.
Keywords Budgeting, Empowerment, Levers of control framework, Management control systems, Middle
managers, Public sector, Social services
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
In the wake of financial crises, austerity politics (Bracci et al., 2015) has increased pressure on
local government organizations (Ahrens and Ferry, 2015; van der Kolk et al., 2015), as
indicated by the growing emphasis on tight, i.e. formal and excessive, budget controls
(cf., Van der Stede, 2001), in times of budget turbulence (Johansson and Siverbo, 2014, p. 272).
Some researchers suggest that budgeting becomes more important in times of crisis (e.g.
Collins et al., 1997; Colignon and Covalski, 1988), while others argue for loosening control (e.g.
Czarniawska and Hedberg, 1985) or even abandoning budgets (Hope and Fraser, 2003).
Becker et al. (2016) argue that the diversity of the findings can be explained by the multiple
uses of budgets where economic crisis increases their importance for planningwhile reducing
the importance of budgeting for performance evaluation due to increased uncertainty.
As noted by Batac and Carassus (2009), public sector organizations responsible for
delivering public welfare services, such as social services, must continuously manage
multiple objectives. Several authors, including Ahrens and Ferry (2015), van der Kolk et al.
(2015), and Llewellyn (1998), have demonstrated that demands may be in conflict with each
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other. It has been argued that complying with potentially conflicting goals may require using
management control systems (MCS) that balance various forms of controls (Kober et al., 2007;
Kloot, 1997. Moreover, several researchers (Bedford et al., 2016; van der Kolk et al., 2015;
Malmi and Brown, 2008; Simons, 1995) suggest that control systems should be studied as a
control package rather than studying the technical aspects or function of specific control
systems.
Among the various analytical frameworks suggested for studyingMCS as a package (e.g.
van der Kolk and Schokker, 2016; Malmi and Brown, 2008), the levers-of-control (LOC)
framework (Simons, 1995) explicitly focuses on the opposing forces that manage tensions
“between freedom and constraint, between empowerment and accountability, between
top-down direction and bottom-up creativity, and between experimentation and efficiency”
(Simons, 1994, p. 4). Of the four levers identified by Simons, two (belief systems and
interactive control systems) have an enabling role, and two others (boundary systems and
diagnostic control systems) have a constraining role (Tessier and Otley, 2012).
Simons (1995) studied MCS from the perspective of top management, defined as “those
responsible for ensuring that strategies are formulated and implemented” (Simons, 1990).
Although subsequent research, as mentioned in Martin et al.’s (2016) review of the empirical
use of the LOC framework, extended the framework to lower management levels, few studies
(Deschamps, 2019; Frow et al., 2010; Pettersen and Solstad, 2015; Tuomela, 2005) actually
incorporated lower management and discussed how controls at lower and higher levels of
management are coupled.
Top management may decide on a strategy and overall MCS design, but local MCS and
vertical coupling, i.e. coupling between hierarchical levels, of MCS are important in achieving
objectives and implementing strategies (Frow et al., 2010; Deschamps, 2019). Most literature
on MCS as a package of control systems only consider horizontal couplings, e.g. coupling
between control elements at the same hierarchical levels or between intended and actually
used control packages. Noticeable exceptions include Van der Hengel et al. (2014), who
focused on 12Dutchmunicipalities and found that control systemswere often loosely coupled
across various organizational levels, and van der Kolk and Schokker (2016), who found that
municipal plans and departmental plans were tightly coupled.
The present paper investigates MCS in the social services of a Danish municipality and
purports to answer the following three research questions: (1) How can budgeting processes
balance tight budget with flexibility and quality? (2) How do middle managers develop and
use MCS to comply with potentially conflicting objectives? and (3) How are locally developed
MCS coupled with top management goals?
In addressing these research questions, this paper uses Simons’s (1995) LOC as an analytical
framework and conducts a qualitative study of a psychiatry and disability department in a
Danish municipality, referred to as Alpha, focusing on both top-management’s intentions and
middlemanagers’ interpretations and reactions. This paper is relevant for practitioners because
it connects management accounting with managerial work (Berry et al., 2009; Hall, 2010; Van
der Stede, 2015) and explores how accounting systems andpractices in public servicesmight be
designed, implemented and operated to generate positive consequences that outweigh
associated risks (Jacobs and Cuganesan, 2014; Cuganesan et al., 2014). In particular, this paper
contributes to practice by demonstrating how tight budget control in social services can
improve flexibility, quality and professional judgment.
Becker et al. (2016) noted that previous research on budgeting almost exclusively focused
on the performance evaluation function of budgets while “rarely accounting for other
functions budgeting plays in organizations” (Becker et al., 2016, p. 1,509). The present paper
contributes to literature by addressing Becker et al.’s (2016) call for more research on the
functional emphasis of budgeting and their diagnostic or interactive use. This paper shows in
line with Frow et al. (2010) and Sandalgaard and Bukh (2014) that budgets play an important
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role in organizations that simultaneously face uncertainty and a need for financial control.
Specifically, this paper demonstrates that increased focus on budgeting in planning
processes not only reduces perceived uncertainty and increases budget compliance but is also
instrumental in increasing flexibility and improving quality.
By showing how MCS is used by middle managers positioned close to the end service in
the public sector, this paper adds to the growing literature about MCS in the public sector
(Kloot, 1997; Batac and Carassus, 2009; Kober et al., 2007; Abernethy and Brownell, 1999;
Kominis and Dudau, 2012). The study shows that middle managers design local control
systems or add methods to existing control frameworks in order to make them comply with
local conditions and to tighten the coupling with top management goals and upper
hierarchical levels.
This paper also adds to the limited literature (Deschamps, 2019; Frow et al., 2010;
Marginson and Bui, 2009; Tuomela, 2005) regarding the perspective of middle management
when applying the LOC framework. Moreover, it contributes to the literature on how middle
management uses MCS to interact with top management (van der Kolk and Schokker, 2016;
Marginson, 2002; Raes et al., 2011) when strategies are implemented and when MCS are
supplemented with local control systems. Previous studies of the vertical coupling of MCS
focused on results controls and the use of MCS for performance measurement (e.g. Van der
Hengel et al., 2014; van der Kolk and Schokker, 2016), where loose coupling between MCS at
hierarchical levels are common. The present paper supplements this literature by not only
showing that vertical coupling becomes tighter when budgeting is used for planning
purposes but also indicating how the interactive use of budget and planning systems
facilitate this process.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the framework
for the empirical analysis, including the LOC framework and the role of middle management
and budgeting in turbulent times. Section 3 presents the empirical setting and describes the
methodology, while Section 4 empirically presents the components of the MCS at Alpha from
the perspective of top management. Finally, Section 5 shows how middle management
interprets and uses MCS, while Section 6 discusses the empirical results and concludes
the paper.
2. Analytical framework
MCS are often described as systems used to align organizational behaviors with goals and
strategies (Deschamps, 2019; Otley, 1980). While management accounting techniques, such
as budgeting, are central to management control (Otley, 1999, p. 370), MCS is a broader term
that encompasses other forms of control (Malmi and Brown, 2008). Moreover, in the MCS
literature, conflicting demands have been shown to create tensions between predictable goal
achievement and the need for flexibility, innovation and learning (Abernethy and Brownell,
1999; Di Francesco and Alford, 2016; Frow et al., 2010; Kastberg and Siverbo, 2013).
Many researchers (Otley, 1999; Ferreira and Otley, 2009; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2009;
Malmi and Brown, 2008) argue that the function and effect of control systems should be
studied as a control package (Bedford et al., 2016; Malmi and Brown, 2008), rather than
focusing on the technical aspects or functions of a specific control system. The present paper
adopts the LOC framework (Simons, 1995) to analyze the MCS package in Alpha. Although
we use this framework to analyze the empirical material, we focus especially on the role of the
budget and planning process within the overall MCS package and how locally developed
MCS are coupled with top management intentions and MCS.
2.1 The levers of control framework
Simons (1995) identified four types of control systems, two of which (belief systems and
interactive control systems) were defined as “positive” and two of which (boundary systems
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and diagnostic control systems) were defined as “negative.” Following Tessier and Otley’s
(2012) arguments, to avoid confusion with the quality of the controls, we call the control
systems “enabling” and “constraining.” The dual role of controls implied by the LOC
framework creates dynamic tensions that influence the attainment of organizational goals
and instigates a “search for opportunities to solve problems” (Mundy, 2010, p. 499).
Belief systems facilitate search for new and attractive opportunities by communicating
values, purposes, and direction and by inspiring organizational members to commit to
corporate objectives. Thus, belief systems are enabling systems that publicize goals and
values to managers that may not be reflected in routine MCS.
Boundary systems specify the scope and the limits of search activity. According to Simons
(1995), they limit exposure to strategic risk by establishing “rules of the game,” specifying
what is acceptable and identifying actions and pitfalls that employees must evade to avoid
wasting organizations’ resources. Any MCS, including financial or non-financial data that
sets out minimum standards or guidelines for behavior can be used by managers as a
boundary LOC (Frow et al., 2010). Besides, budgetary rules and financial restrictions,
boundary systems in social services may also be guidelines that regulate professional
competency, establish consistency in social work, and align the strategies and direction of
political councils.
Diagnostic control systems coordinate and monitor the implementation of intended
strategies and identify exceptions and deviations from plans (Simons, 1995, p. 59). These
diagnostic processes represent the traditional use of MCS, in which corrective actions result
from performance feedback (Mundy, 2010; Marginson and Ogden, 2005; Bedford, 2015).
Diagnostic controls require clear, non-ambiguous andmeasurable performance goals that are
consistent with goal achievement.
Interactive and diagnostic control systems are similar in that they both are feedback and
measurement systems (Martyn et al., 2016). However, the distinction between these two types
of control systems relates more to information use than to technical design. Simons (2000,
p. 216) stated that interactive control systems were used by managers “to personally involve
themselves in the decision activities of subordinates.” Interactive MCS often implies dialog
and knowledge exchange, examining assumptions underlying both current and new,
emerging strategies (Batac and Carassus, 2009; Kominis and Dudau, 2012) and leading to
frequent face-to-face meetings among managers from different parts of the organization.
Some researchers conclude that controls constrain behaviors and reduce creativity (Gilson
et al., 2005; Hirst et al., 2011). However, recent studies that applied the LOC framework
(Deschamps, 2019; Spekle et al., 2017) show that control systems can create productive
tension between control and flexibility, which, in turn, empowers management. This is
especially due to the role of interactive control systems that stimulate and guide emergent
strategies by enabling top-level managers to focus on strategic uncertainties, understanding
and responding to threats and opportunities as competitive conditions change (Janke et al.,
2014). Within the public sector, studies drawing on Simons’s (1995) LOC framework have
shown that interactive control systems enable organizational learning, innovation, and
strategic development (Kloot, 1997; Kober, 2007).
2.2 Applications of the LOC framework
The development of the LOC framework was based on field studies of private-sector
companies (Simons, 1990, 1991, 1995). The framework has, however, been applied within the
public sector as well. Among the 45 LOC studies identified byMartyn et al. (2016), 11 involved
the public sector, and one was conducted with a non-governmental organization.
Rather than studying only the technical aspects of control systems, LOC research has
demonstrated the importance of analyzing the interplay and use of differentMCSs. On the one
hand, a combined and balanced use allows the four levers to reinforce each other.
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According to Kominis and Dudau (2012), financial and non-financial information, used in
traditional diagnostic control systems to measure performance against budgets and goals,
can also be used interactively to identify new challenges and to reduce risk and uncertainty.
Alternatively, as shown by Widener (2007), they can be used to structure and facilitate
interactive debate, helping the organization produce new solutions.
On the other hand, failure of this usage to create balance may cause slower decision-
making, wasted resources, instability, and ultimately, lower performance. Henri (2006)
argued that poor use of diagnostic processes could result in lack of focus, whereas excessive
use could inhibit innovation and creativity. Additionally, according to Sprinkle et al. (2008),
the inability to employ balanced use-of-boundary systems could make them too rigid,
preventing employees from seeking alternative and possibly better solutions.
The LOC framework focuses on managing the tension between creative innovation and
predictable goal achievement, in which traditional, constraining control systems complement
other more enabling forms of control (Bisbe and Otley, 2004). Regarding the public sector, an
emerging stream of LOC literature focuses on the crucial role of interactive controls, in
particular, to create organizational learning (Kloot, 1997; Batac andCarassus, 2009; Abernethy
and Brownell, 1999) and to deal with uncertainty and risk (Kominis and Dudau, 2012).
The literature that draws on Simons’s (1995) LOC framework noted an unclear
demarcation between different MCS (Bisbe and Otley, 2004; Tuomela, 2005; Widener,
2007), asserting that different control systems likely reinforce each other (Widener, 2007;
Kominis and Dudau, 2012) and positing that the distinction between enabling and
constraining control systems is not always clear (Mundy, 2010; Tesser and Otley, 2012).
2.3 The role of middle management
Simons (1995) studied MCS from the perspective of top management, defined as “those
responsible for ensuring that strategies are formulated and implemented” (Simons, 1990).
Although subsequent research, as mentioned in Martin et al.’s (2016) review of the empirical
use of the LOC framework, extended the framework to lower management levels, few studies
(Deschamps, 2019; Frow et al., 2010; Pettersen and Solstad, 2015; Tuomela, 2005) incorporate
lower management and discuss how controls at lower and higher levels of management are
coupled. As shown by both Frow et al. (2010) and Deschamps (2019), although top
managementmay decide on a strategy and overall MCS design, middlemanagementMCS are
important for achieving objectives and implementing strategies.
According to Woolridge et al. (2008), including the perspective of middle management is
crucial for identifying and generating new ideas. Moreover, in their vicarious positions in the
hierarchy in which they coordinate the delivery of an organization’s end service (Dutton et al.,
1997), middle managers must continuously position themselves between top-down and
bottom-up processes (Balugon and Johnson, 2004; Floyd and Woolridge, 1997; Conway and
Monks, 2011).
Deschamps (2019) argued that, when studying the consistency of MCS and their role in
implementing strategy, the actions and intentions of managers at different hierarchical levels
are important. He also argued that an autonomous use of MCS at each hierarchical level may
be important to understand the control package. Similarly, Frow et al. (2010) found that
middle managers may have difficulty determining when to use a particular control system,
how much emphasis to apply, or how to combine different MCSs deployed by top
management and Tuomela (2005) found that diagnostic control systems developed by senior
management can be used interactively by middle management.
2.4 Budgeting in turbulent times
In recent years, traditional annual budgets have been criticized for creating “fixed
performance contracts” (Hope and Fraser, 2003) that are unsuitable in turbulent times or in
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fast-changing environments (Sandalgaard and Bukh, 2014). Consequently, it is suggested
that budgets should be replaced with a more adaptive control package, based on
management accounting techniques such as rolling forecasts, non-financial performance
measures, and relative performance evaluations. However, previous studies (e.g.
Sandalgaard and Bukh, 2014; Bourmistrov and Kaarbøe, 2013; Frow et al., 2010; Henttu-
Aho and J€arvinen, 2013) show that budgets play an important role in organizations that
simultaneously face uncertainty and require financial control.
Bhimani et al. (2018, p. 307) mention that “early budgeting studies more generally argued
for the greater relevance of traditional financial controls such as annual budgets in uncertain
environments, and cost-focused strategies,”whereas other budgeting studies over the last 15
years argued that accounting systems should remain relevant and beneficial inmore unstable
environments (Johansson and Siverbo, 2014; Marginson et al., 2014). Moreover, previous
research stated that budgeting and the management of ambiguities in organizations can
positively impact managerial behaviors (Johansen and Siverbo, 2014). Furthermore, Becker
et al. (2016), in their study of changes in budgeting processes during an economic crisis,
indicated that increased uncertainty can result in an increased focus on continuous planning,
through re-budgeting or preparation of forecasts. Regarding the role of budgeting in
performance evaluations, Becker et al. (2016, p. 1508) showed that “performance evaluations
with budgetary targets became less important and gave way to other indictors.”
van der Kolk and Schokker (2016) not only draw attention to the importance of studying
MCS elements as a package of techniques but also to studying the vertical coupling of MCS
elements between different hierarchical levels. Most studies of vertical coupling ofMCS focus
on results controls and the use of MCS for performance measurement (e.g. Van der Hengel
et al., 2014; van der Kolk and Schokker, 2016), where loose coupling between MCS at
hierarchical levels is common. Focusing on the role of budgeting for planning purposes, as in
the present paper, the results from Becker et al. (2016) might imply that vertical coupling
becomes tighter when budgeting is used for planning purposes.
3. Methodology
3.1 Case study setting
Denmark has a long history of publicly funded social services, which are provided by
municipalities and regulated by the Danish Social Services Act. The social services can be
broadly divided into three areas: elderly care, special needs for children, and special needs for
adults. These services, part of the Social Services Act, are regulated separately and usually
organized in different municipal departments.
Alpha, a medium-sized municipality with about 65,000 inhabitants, is situated in the
vicinity of Copenhagen, the capital of Denmark. It was chosen for this study because it has
been mentioned in reports and by experts in social services as having successfully balanced
the budget within the social services. The municipality has three divisions, organized by the
type of services provided. The Social, Health and Work division includes four separate
departments: Elderly Care, Health, Work, and Psychiatry and Disability. In addition to the
service divisions, the municipality has established transverse support departments for
human resources, finance and digitization. The Department of Psychiatry and Disability
(DPD), which is responsible for social services to adults aged over 18 years, is organized with
centralized teams and decentralized units.
The centralized teams include a quality and development team run by the deputy head, an
administration team led by a department head, and a purchasing team headed by a
purchasing manager. The purchasing team buys services and assesses clients’ needs and
eligibility, provides referrals to residential homes, workshops and home care and follows
clients’ progress in all cases.
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The decentralized part of the department consists of a number of service provider units
that, for instance, provide residential homes of varying sizes and workshops for the mentally
and physically disabled, with each unit led by a provider manager. It also includes one large
unit that delivers services, such as home care, residences and workshops, to people with
psychosocial disorders.
3.2 Data collection and analysis
The data was collected as part of a larger study of management control systems within social
services in Danish municipalities. This area has in most municipalities experienced higher
expenses, greater difficulties in complying with budgets, and limited insights into the cost
and quality of social services compared with other parts of the public sector. The study of the
Department of Psychiatry and Disability in Alpha was conducted in May 2012, using
semi-structured interviews and document studies.
We interviewed 13 individuals, including five senior managers, five middle managers and
three staff specialists. The top-management interviewees included the Director and Deputy
Director in the Social and Health Care Division, the Department Head and Deputy Head of the
Psychiatry and Disability Department, and the municipality’s Head of Budgeting and
Analysis. Interviews with middle management included the manager responsible for
purchasing and referrals in the Department of Psychiatry and Disability and four managers
responsible for provision of services. The interviewees also included two staff specialists
responsible for planning social work initiatives in the Department of Psychiatry and
Disability and one controller from the Finance Department.
The studywas initiated by holding ameetingwith the Department Head andDeputyHead
of the Psychiatry andDisability Department, one staff specialist from the department and one
controller from the Finance Department. The research project was presented, and we
obtained an initial understanding of the department’s organizational design. The meeting
also clarified the interview protocol.
Documents such as budgets, annual reports, strategy papers and political memorandums
were collected onsite, and other documents were found on the municipality’s website. Using
documents as a data source implies that these data are available without the intervention of
the researchers. Thus, such documents represent “what participants are actually doing in the
world–without being dependent on being asked by researchers” (Silverman, 2014, p. 276). By
cross-referencing interviews with each other and with documents, multiple data-collection
methods increase the data’s validity. Using a semi-structured interview protocol helped the
interviewees focus on issues important to them, thereby making it possible to explore
relevant issues.
The interview protocol was based on the LOC framework and structured into six themes.
The first theme addressed background questions about the position, education and
experience of the interviewees, while the second theme focused on the organization and their
perspectives about the history of the organization, along with their views about present and
future challenges. In relation to the LOC framework, the questions under this theme gave the
interviewees an opportunity to address strategic challenges and uncertainties.
Within the third theme, the interviewees were asked what they found to be the most
important aspect about the control framework. On the one hand, these questions addressed
the framework in a more general sense, while on the other hand, they addressed how the
interviewees perceived specific control elements such as budget compliance and
responsibility in this respect.
The fourth theme established an understanding on how budget control and professional
competency are related in daily operations, for example, by asking about managers’ tools and
methods. Moreover, the interviewees were asked about decision processes and
communication, and how managers and employees perceived constraints and trade-offs.
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The fifth theme addressed how long-term planningwas regarded and prioritized, both as part
of the control framework and in daily practice. Finally, questions in the sixth theme queried
internal and external collaborations to understand the level of influence in daily practice, the
political organization, and its collaboration with the administration. Overall, themes three to
five addressed the control elements within the LOC framework.
Interviewees were assured confidentiality, and the interviews lasted 1–2 h. All interviews
were recorded, fully transcribed, and together with the collected documents, analyzed using
the NVIVO 10 qualitative software package. This made it possible, using a systematic
approach for data reduction, classification and interpretation, to reduce the qualitative data’s
analytical bias, which improved the study’s reliability. It also improved validity by
establishing a fit between the research themes andwhat was actually observed and identified
during data collection and analysis.
The data was initially coded to identify specific control elements and how these elements
were used. Next, the role of the control elements in relation to the four levers of the LOC
frameworkwas coded. Further, codingwas done to identify the use of accounting information
and control systems, and to determine how middle managers interacted with employees and
top management. In order to improve reliability, the initial coding was conducted by both
researchers and differences were discussed.
4. Alpha’s management control systems
4.1 Direction and target setting
The management control systems at Alpha reinforce the municipality’s hierarchical
organization and cascade political and administrative intentions and objectives. Every four
years, a city council is elected, and political committees governing various activities are
formed. As one of its first major tasks, the city council decides on a strategy for the electoral
period. Furthermore, a common practice in Danishmunicipalities is that the committeesmake
explicit declarations or policies for their major service areas. Both the declarations and
strategies are in practice formulated at the administrative level but in close interaction with
the committee governing the area in question.
In Alpha, a new so-called Disability Declaration was introduced in 2010. The declaration
did not specify exact initiatives, but it set the direction for the administration:
We are on the edge of implementing a whole new approach to the field, which is the rehabilitation
perspective. With this new way of thinking our future work will focus on what clients are capable of
and not so much on what they need to be compensated for. (Disability Declaration, 2010–2013)
The top management at the Department of Psychiatry and Disability complemented the
chosen strategy and declaration with two action plans: one for clients with impaired physical
and mental functions and another for those with psychosocial disorders. Although these
plans are termed “action plans” they are long-term policy directions and can be seen as part of
the belief system:
The plan, representing our effort within social psychiatry, and focusing on recovery and
rehabilitation, must be anchored in an organization where creativity, availability, holistic and
adjoined effort, user involvement and interdisciplinarity thrive. (Action Plan of Social
Psychiatry, 2020)
The action plans are termed 10-years plans to indicate the long-term perspective. At the
department level, an elaborate performance management system translates the vision of the
“action” plans to specific yearly targets, which become part of the budgeting process, and
function as a diagnostic control system. For example, an objective in 2011 was to increase the
purchasing of services from Alpha’s own service providers, and a target of improving from
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64.9% to 67% was set and included in a so-called performance contract (Greve, 2000) for the
purchasing department.
4.2 Quality standards
To ensure case management consistency and to comply with legislation, formal quality
standards, functioning as a boundary system, clarify the service level that can be expected by
clients. Moreover, these quality standards not only specify the methods used by the
department to assess the needs and eligibility of clients but also clarify the processes and
principles used to refer clients to adequate services.
Although the boundary system did not specify financial limits and targets, the interviews
and several documents made clear that quality service implied cost-consciousness and
rehabilitation. The Disability Action plan stated that “[t]he goal with rehabilitation is to make
clients more self-reliant” and that it “will release resources to clients with increased needs.”
Cost-conscious behavior was also implicit in the quality standards, which clarified what is
acceptable for social workers and how to prioritize issues in the assessment and referral
process. The director of the Social and Health Division explained that:
We expect our social workers to think in costs, but now and then we see that a given explanation for
rejection is that the intervention was too expensive. That is not ok. You do your research and find
services capable of providing what we request based on the assessment of the client. If one of the
adequate services is less expensive than the others, we of course will choose that one, but we will
never do anything based on costs alone. (Director)
Finally, the department’s referral practices, which were described in a document that
supplemented the quality standards, became an important part of the boundary system.More
specifically, it stated that case workers are required to present all recommendations to a
committee headed by the purchasing manager, which has the final say in referral decisions.
4.3 The budgeting system
Common to all divisions, the backbone of the municipality’s control framework is the budget
control system, which is operated by the finance division. The head of the Budgeting and
Analysis department, in describing the budgeting culture, emphasizes the dialog it fosters:
It has become culture, and everyone knows that this is how things work. If one of the divisions is
overspending, they know to involve us as soon as possible and documentwhether they are capable of
fully or partly financing the additional consumption because they know it will get right back at them
otherwise. (Head of Budgeting and Analysis)
As stated inAlpha’swritten budgeting regulations, the budget system is based on two overall
principles: “management by objectives” and “decentralization.” According to the head of
Budgeting and Analysis, these two principles should strike a balance between freedom and
constraints. Managers have to focus on tight budget controls and follow the directions set
forth by the city council and the belief system. At the same time, decentralization provides
managers with flexibility, fostered by the belief that frontlinemanagers know how tomanage
resources relating to the services that they provide:
If you follow in the right direction, and make sure your budget balance, which is a discipline we all
know how to perform, from the mayor and down, then you have a giant room tomaneuver. (Director)
All departments with administrative tasks are regarded as cost centers and must comply
with budgets. Further, the purchasing team, which is responsible for assessing needs and
provide referrals, is a cost center with a fixed budget that is not adjusted by demographic
developments either annually or during the budget year. The principle of a fixed budget is
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based on the decision thatmanagers must prioritize resources without jeopardizing the needs
of clients and compromising the quality of care. However, since the needs of individual clients
as well as the number of clients eligible for services change over time, management must
continuously focus on these aspects. In addition, on-going dialogues about the development
and status of individual client cases are necessary. Such management processes indicate an
interactive use of the budgeting system in which a cost-conscious, professional approach
improves assessments and referrals by matching clients with the most appropriate services
at the lowest cost and following up with revisions when necessary:
We have a fixed budget, because the municipality to some extent believes that the field is
controllable. Then we make analyses now and then, e.g., next year we will get extra 650,000 euros,
which will be reduced again in following years. Therefore, we will initiate an analysis and from
previous analyses we have been able to detect that something is coming and that is why the budget is
being increased temporarily. (Deputy Head)
The service provider units are structured as profit centers and funded according to the level
of activity in the unit. When the master budget is developed, units are allocated a budget
based on capacity and expected occupancy rate. Budgets are regulated quarterly based on
actual occupancy rates in the previous budget-year period. This method was chosen in order
to focus on capacity utilization and to motivate managers to lower costs and improve quality:
The budget regulation model implies control of the expense budget and rate revenue, and that
providing managers should adjust the level of expenses and comply with the budget. On the one
hand, this model provides the managers with room to maneuver, and on the other hand, it provides
an incentive to keep the occupancy rate high or to adjust capacity promptly if demand decreases.
(Principles for Management Accounting 2006)
Decentralization enables individual managers decide how to allocate their budgets, as long as
they remain in accordancewith political goals and prioritizations. The head of the department
emphasized that service provider managers “have room to maneuver and they can use the
budget the way they find best.” To motivate managers to undertake tight budget controls,
any overspending or underspending in principle can be carried over to the following year.
Although overspending generally is carried over, surpluses can be carried over with the
approval of the political committee. This takes place in most cases. The head of Budgeting
and Analysis explains the reasons clearly:
We have no limits for howmuch can be brought forward, and that is an important part of our control
framework, with the purpose to make sure that everyone is committed and take responsibility, and
that happenswhen you can keep themoney you save during the year. If we take the savings from the
managers just one year, it will take 10 years to rebuild the trust again. That is why we try to avoid
freezing of savings. (Head of Budgeting and Analysis)
The allocation of budgets to departments and units is closely linkedwith a formal monitoring
and feedback process during the budget year, as stated in the following document:
Ordinary budget follow-up is done every month. The task is completed by the individual unit in
collaborationwith the department/division. As aminimumamore thorough budget follow-up should
be completed at every quarter of the year. (Principles for Management Accounting in Providing
Units 2007)
4.4 The purchasing budget
While the budget control system focuses on the current budget year, a longer-term
perspective is necessary for evaluating individual client cases and determining when
investments in rehabilitation are made. The budgeting system and the purchasing budget
can be interpreted as feedback and measurement systems, i.e. diagnostic control systems.
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However, there is a distinction between the diagnostic and interactive systems in which the
personal involvement of managers characterizes the interactive control system (cf. Simons,
2000, p. 216). In Alpha, the purchasing budget enables management to focus on uncertainties
and respond to threats and opportunities, thus serving as an interactive control system. The
Head of Budgeting and Analysis explained this as follows:
We have proactive management control, which means that we attempt to focus on the longer-term.
What do we think will happen? How will the number of elderly client progress? This enables us to
identify challenges and how it is expected to influence costs for us to focus on what can be done in
advance, so we will not experience what we see in a lot of other municipalities where they do not
initiate action in time and suddenly are forced to make big cutbacks. (Head of Budgeting and
Analysis)
The Deputy Head of the Department of Psychiatry and Disability also stated the following:
I think it is important continuously tomake sure to analyzewhat the futuremight bring. Analyses do
not necessarily solve the problems, but make sure we are aware of the problems. Analyses also make
sure we reach conclusions on what to do. I believe it to be extremely important to be ahead of future
changes. (Deputy Head)
The cornerstone in this interactive control system is an Excel sheet referred to as the
purchasing budget. Created in the mid-2000s, the spreadsheet contains all relevant
information about each client receiving social services from Alpha and has been
continuously updated. From the top management’s perspective, the purchasing budget
serves a dual purpose: On the one hand to control the budget by comparing it monthlywith all
service purchases and update year-end spending prognoses, and on the other hand to follow-
up on individual cases, ensuring that client services remain adequate.
The purchasing budget is also used internally in the purchasing department for analyses
and prognoses. Although short-term analyses are largely based on financial information, the
interactive processes include both financial and non-financial issues, for example, dealing
with a target group’s costs, handling the capacity and development of services of new target
groups, and developing existing capacity. The head of the Psychiatry and Disability
department explained it in the following way:
We are initiating an analysis of how one of our residential homes should look in the future.What kind
of residents do we anticipate will be using this particular home? We know it is not the same as those
residing there today. Some might be the same, but some of them will be different. Then we also must
think about our own needs for capacity and a lot about the needs in the region (other municipalities
demand for provision). Should the home be a specialized residential home, or should it be a place
capable of managing diversity in the needs of residents? (Head of Department)
The fixed purchasing budget makes the interactive use of the budget more imperative. The
ability to identify, for example, new client groups eligible for different services from those
provisioned makes necessary to respond to changes and influence future spending. The
ability to offer adequate services at the right time is critical, since establishment of more
capacity is a long-term process. Moreover, failing to respond in a timelymanner may result in
the provision of insufficient services, which can lead to higher costs. Another consequence
may be the need to purchase adequate services from private suppliers or other municipalities.
However, this can be more expensive over the long term due to the limited ability to influence
rates and services.
5. The perceptions of middle managers
All middle managers in charge of service provider units displayed insights into the overall
control framework and how processes of the different systems comprising it are formally
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organized, including knowledge about goals, vision, and overall strategy. Overall, they were
most interested in understanding how a chosen direction impacted their own unit and how to
implement strategies successfully. Furthermore, they focused on complying with budget
goals and taking a cost-conscious approach to daily operations. Even though cost-
consciousness was considered part of any manager’s responsibility, all managers knew that
this was a priority for top management.
We know this is whywe are hired.We are here to complywith budget goals andmake sure to provide
quality services. Butwemust complywith budget goals and if we don’t succeed, it’s bye, bye. At least
that is what we assume. (Service Provider Manager 2)
One manager explained that she had to deal with overspending for a few years because of a
mismatch between the allocated budget and services that should be provided. Although this
problem existedwhen shewas appointedmanager, shewas fully aware of the need for budget
compliance:
I do not know what would happen if I did it again, e.g., in two years. I actually think I would leave
myself, but I do not think we would need to discuss that very much, because there is no doubt that
what happened the first two years could not continue” (Service Provider Manager 3)
5.1 The emergence of local control systems
When the study was conducted, implementation of a new focus on rehabilitation in the
assessment and referral process was a top priority of the purchasing manager. In order to
have the providing units cooperate in implementing the necessary changes, it was
emphasized that local strategies and principles were aligned with the overall strategy as
well as the elements in the belief systems. The purchasing manager especially
emphasized that
...the disability declaration is the overall strategy for what we are here for, howwe should work. That
means we have a lot of weight behind us when we explain that . . . we do not, as such, purchase
services in other parts of the country. . . It meanswe have an outline for our work showing us inwhat
direction we are heading. (Purchasing Manager)
Although top management generally executed strict budget control and continuously
focused on achieving budget goals, one service provider manager stated the following:
There is a reasoned and realistic perception of the balancing budgets. They know how much things
cost. No doubt about that. (Service Provider Manager 3)
The purchasing manager further explained how the control system helped her create
sufficiently consistent case management, which also enhanced the quality of social work
tasks. Together, the assessment and referral processes and tools provided the manager
with a solid platform that helped her closely follow case management, without harming
case workers’ autonomy, while assessing needs and completing recommendations for
services.
To supplement the professional control system, the purchasing manager has a staff
specialist, who, as a member of the committee making referrals based on an assessment of
client eligibility and adequacy of services, exerts control over case work. The staff specialist
also completes an annual quality standard update and provides professional analyses and
prognoses. Regarding her work, the staff specialist stated the following:
At the moment I am involved in analyzing what we purchase in other municipalities, why we
purchase outside andwhy arewe not offering the services in-house. But I have a professional view on
these questions and examine the professional reflections and judgment that led to decisions of
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purchasing in other municipalities instead of trying to provide the services in our own units. (Staff
Specialist 1)
Although service provider managers generally make autonomous decisions, they are also
responsible for budget compliance and for achieving non-financial objectives specified in
performance contracts. As one service provider manager explained:
I actually like that we have parameters to measure ourselves against. And I also like that the more
you succeed with your projects, the more freedom you get. I mean that follows with the success. . .
What I mean is that I am themanager here and it sort of has to bemewhomake things work. (Service
Provider Manager 3)
Most service provider managers have developed local systems to implement action plans and
to comply with targets during the year. For instance, one service provider manager’s
management group produces amaster plan every six months, consisting of visions and goals
to be implemented in the organization. The master plan is discussed at every management
meeting. For this manager, the performance contracts and the action plans are relevant
management tools that help him keep on track in implementing strategies and complying
with objectives. The manager, though, finds contracts’ time horizons problematic because
“they have a one-year perspective. It is fine with goals and targets, but a one-year perspective
is just not right. You need a long-term focus” (Service Provider Manager 1). For this reason,
several service provider managers supplement the department-wide budgeting system and
the one-year horizons in contracts with their own systems in order to strengthen the long-
term implementation of local initiatives.
When asked about the systems that they used to adhere to targets, all service provider
managers said that they developed their own local systems, methods, and principles to
improve cost efficiency. One manager, for instance, made work scheduling more efficient by
cutting back on expensive temporary workers and reducing absence rates. Her deputy
assessedwhether or not a tempwas needed based onminimum staffing requirements. Noting
that many employees preferred working part-time and supplementing the fixed wage with
overtime pay at a higher rate, she also changed the principles for granting overtime pay such
that more flexible managers could use their own staff, instead of expensive temporary staff.
Moreover, since it was decided that overtime work was only possible for employees with less
than 5% sick leave in the previous month, the overall sick leave rate decreased.
5.2 Cost-consciousness in professional work
Along with the new direction for social work, the demands for cost-consciousness also
increased, and the purchasingmanager and her staff specialist continuously focused on costs
and required case workers to be cost-conscious when assessing and making
recommendations for referrals to services. However, the staff specialist was worried that
the strict financial focus will become a barrier for implementing rehabilitation strategies, as
stated in the following:
We are still quite far from the optimal. I don’t think our clients notice it. I think, perhaps, it is more
something our case workers recognize and something I recognize. I recognize it because we are
supposed to have all these ideas and continuously focus in that direction, but are stopped because of
finances, with the consequence that we cannot proceed all the way. (Staff Specialist 1)
For the purchasing manager, who is proud of managing resources efficiently, being cost-
conscious is an integral part of the daily task. For example:
We want to have available resources for the next client who comes through our door. And therefore,
it is great to know, that I will have the resources, because the services already provided to our clients
match their needs exactly. They do not get too much or too little. (Purchasing Manager)
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By continuously analyzing expenses stipulated in the purchasing budget, the purchasing
manager has developed her own way of managing potential tensions between quality, cost,
and a fixed budget. At the beginning of the yearly cycle, she examines the tenmost expensive
cases, cases where the client is above 70 years old, and cases where clients stayed in
residential care outside the municipality. The main purpose was not to diminish services but
rather to assess changes in needs and to negotiate reductions in payments to providers, both
outside and inside Alpha.
Professional follow-up is time-consuming because it most often involves visiting
residential homes to meet with clients, as well as local management and social workers
who assess clients’ needs, development, and functions. Whenever it is possible to make
changes without jeopardizing quality, the resources saved are usually considerable. For
example:
Potentially, we could save 250.000 euros alone on 20 clients and that is aminimum. It is realistic and I
myself have been visiting the residential homes with our purchasing manager and talked with case
workers to examine what kind of client are we talking about and what are their needs. How much
should this cost, not what are we paying, but what is it supposed to cost! (Staff Specialist 1)
5.3 Professional controls
The professional control system, which is supported by top management and based on
quality standards and assessments, is not a major focus area for service provider managers
because these boundary systems largely address assessment and referral rather than
provision of services. Consequently, no common professional control systems were put in
place in service provider units. However, several managers explained that they initiated
projects in their own specific areas of responsibility and also set up behavioral boundaries.
Although these were different between units, a common theme was clarifying and defining
acceptable versus unacceptable behavior. One manager noticed that many employees were
focusing on their own rights and needs instead of their respective job requirements. In
response, the manager decided to create a project focusing on work ethics and values, as
stated in the following:
We have had plenty of focus on definingwhat paid employment actually means, such aswhat are we
here for? We are here to do our job! What is the task? And so on. It has been worthwhile because our
employees have a more balanced approach to work now. Their private life does not interfere to the
same degree as it used to. We have managed to outline what their employment includes and what
tasks they are expected to perform. (Service Provider Manager 3)
Another manager explained how she and her deputy continuously focused on the daily
interactions between employees and clients:
We go out on the floor to see with our own eyes how they talk to each other and how they treat each
other. And then we talk about it at staff meetings and in the management group. Under most
circumstances it is not a problem to keep a civil tone, but if a resident suddenly loses temper and
strikes at you, it may result in you getting angry. And those situations we talk about because it can
give you a better understanding of how to deal with it. (Service Provider Manager 2)
5.4 Budgeting in practice
The monthly budget follow-up process is perceived by middle managers as one of the most
important interactions with top management. As a diagnostic control procedure, although
managers find the process rather formal, it motivates them to focus on complying with
budget goals. It also signals the importance of budget goal achievement by top management.
In this way, the budgeting system also signals that managing budgets is as an essential
managerial skill equal important for professional competency.
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All of the service provider managers had an educational background as social service
professionals, some with master’s degrees in, for example, psychology or learning. However,
they were not educated in budgeting or management accounting in general. As a result, some
managers in their budget follow-upswere assisted by a controller from the budget department:
If everything is looking good it is uncomplicated. If it does not look so good, you are called in for a
meeting in the department to talk about what can be done. Those talks I find productive because I
also see new things or ways to do things differently. (Service Provider Manager 3)
Since the main focus of these follow-ups is the budget, the term “looking good” implies
compliance with the budget in question. According tomiddlemanagers, interactions with top
management about a unit’s budget usually only take place if a significant budgetary
deviation occurs and no realistic plan exists to remedy the deviation. Otherwise, managers
interact with the controller, who reports back to top management. However, when a
representative from top management becomes involved (usually a deputy department head),
one manager remarked that this helped her correct budgetary imbalances.
With increasingly tight budgets, managers found it difficult to obtain additional
approbation or even to apply for one. As a result, they became even more committed to
achieving budget goals. However, they also noted an inconsistency between budget regulation
principles and practice. Although budgets should only be regulated when the number of
clients changed, they have been revised if underspending occurred for several years.
Managers generally agree with this approach because they need to balance resource
allocation between units if imbalances exist. However, reallocations increase uncertainty for
individual managers because they affect other managers’ budgets in a system where the
overall budget is fixed. One manager noted that top-management reallocations significantly
influenced her ability to succeed because it created flexibility that helped her attain a
balanced budget, as stated in the following:
Eventually the budget was revised in the sense that it is nowmore realistic according to the needs of
the residents and times has changed which has made it more attractive to work with our group of
residents again. Today we have a sensible budget and it is possible to reach the budget goals.
(Service Provider Manager 3)
Despite the importance of these reallocations, the same manager expressed concerns about
them. She noted that their implementation increased uncertainty. Moreover, any changes in
priorities and the allocation of resources made within the year, although not common,
increased such uncertainty.
The ability to carry over surpluses and deficits to the following year was highly
appreciated by service provider managers because the additional flexibility allowed them to
prioritize between years without foregoing budgetary discipline. However, the principle was
challenged because overall budget achievements were closely monitored, and the total
budget for all service provider units remained fixed. Therefore, any additional spending in
one unit had to be countered by lower spending in another. In practice, this required dialogue,
and managers were called upon to postpone projects to balance the overall budget. Although
managers appreciate this approach and encourage such cooperation, it makes future savings
transfers more difficult to predict. According to one service provider manager:
I find it very important that it is possible to transfer resources and I do not have any experience with
any of our savings being held back. Right now, we are planning to transfer money to buy a new car
and I know there is a riskwewill not be able tomake that transfer. However, I think the dialogue with
the department has been very good and it is clear they respect our need to save for a new car. (Service
Provider Manager 1)
Empowering
middle
managers in
social services
5.5 Challenging the system
Themiddle managers emphasize how they challenge the system, e.g. when amismatch exists
between budgets or if mistakes occur. For example, one manager stated the following:
I wrote to the department, explaining that [the budget was insufficient] and we had to talk about it.
There was a mismatch and I knew we hadn’t changed anything, expanded or something like that.
(Service Provider Manager 1)
The manager contacted the department and found that mistakes in the preparation of the
budget had been made. The purchasing manager also found that complying with budget
goals was difficult, especially one year when actual purchases exceeded the budget for the
first time in five years:
From 2007 until 2010 I have managed to balance the budget, but in 2011 we exceed the budget, and it
is actually only because of few clients. We always focus on changes in needs to accommodate the
services we provide without jeopardizing quality. I am very professional, and it is very important to
me that I possess substantial knowledge when I match and follow-up. Because of that I have always
been able to find resources if we have been spending too much of the budget. (Purchasing Manager)
The manager explained that the additional spending was caused by an increase in the
number of young people with autism who after becoming adults were eligible for services
fromDPD, resulting in a significant increase in expenses.When the cause for excess spending
was identified, the department completed analyses and prognoses, informing politicians
about these future challenges.
The analyses prepared in the purchasing department also took the number of people
ceasing to receive social services during the period into consideration as the exit rates from
social services were noted to be only half that of previous years. This made it impossible to
balance the budget despite substantial efforts. Ultimately, additional funding was granted,
with the condition that the division balance its future annual budgets within three years.
Although this situation perturbed the purchasing manager, she did not have to deal with
the challenge herself. Top management provided substantial support, and the political
decision to grant additional funding was based on the local council’s trust in the division’s
management group because of its budget management of the previous year. Additional
funding also was allowed owing to the detailed analyses and plans presented to politicians
regarding future intake patterns. The purchasing manager noted that the situation
demonstrated how to balance tensions caused by strict adherence to plans versus exceptions
made because of specific and extraordinary situations.
Most managers agreed that strategy and control processes are determined by top
managers in the municipality. A service provider manager stated that he only succeeded in
getting influence on the producing of the action plan because of pressure on the department:
The plan was initially top down, andwe have spent quite a lot of time and energy to get it to our level
and negotiated andworked on it, which has resulted in even the clients being able to explain what it’s
all about. This has been high priority for us. (Service Provider Manager 1)
6. Discussion and conclusion
This paper analyzed how a Danish municipality facing increasing financial pressure and
environmental uncertainty attempts to balance tight budget control (c.f. Van der Stede, 2001)
with the provision of flexible and high-quality social services. On the basis of document
studies and interviews, we analyzed how MCS components, interpreted within the LOC
framework, maintained tight budget control, while also enabling flexibility and improving
quality in both the short- and long-term.
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6.1 How can budgeting processes maintain tight budget control with flexibility?
Strict rules, concepts, and standardized working methods seem to be important components
of MCS, functioning as a boundary system linking social work practice, the budgeting model,
and the belief system. Simons (1995) called boundary and diagnostic control systems
“negative control systems,” but they are not bad controls (cf., Adler and Borys, 1996). Rather,
they are supporting strategic implementations, which Simons emphasizedwhen he explained
that “[b]oundary systems are like brakes on a car: without them, cars (or organizations)
cannot operate at high speeds” (Simons, 1995, p. 41). Thus, boundary systems can, as
mentioned by Deschamps (2019), provide professional and structural boundaries that enable
MCS to act freely within these boundaries (Lamon and Monar, 2002).
We associated, as is common (Ahrens and Chapman, 2004; Ferreira and Otley, 2009),
boundary systems with constraining controls. However, both Frow et al. (2010) and Mundy
(2010) demonstrated that “constraining control systems” may have an enabling role.
Deschamps (2019), in a study of a large Belgian public organization, also concluded that
boundaries actually empowermanagers at lower hierarchical levels, but only if they provided
a sense of direction, security, and predictability. In studying Alpha, we similarly find that
boundary systems, as a professional control system, empower managers. When adequate
boundary systems were not in place, middle managers added to the control package to set up
boundaries. Thus, this study demonstrated that constraining control systems can empower
managers without compromising their capacity to maintain control.
In studying Alpha, we found that middle managers used management control systems to
provide a clear structure and that issues that occur within budgeting systems are often well-
known and predicable. As noted by Blackman et al. (2006) and Head and Alford (2015), tight
budget control could constrain creative problem-solving (Gilson et al., 2005; Hirst et al., 2011).
This was not the case in the present paper. Conversely, it provided several examples of
managers finding creative ways to solve problems, not only because control systems can be
used interactively but also because the decentralization of control and responsibility for
achieving budget targets can empower front-line managers to ‘‘foster innovation and
responsiveness” (Hope and Fraser, 2003, p. 158), as Frow et al. (2010) mentioned.
Consequently, it can be argued that diagnostic controls also enable problem-solving.
In conclusion, this paper shows that budgets play an important role in organizations that
simultaneously face uncertainty and require financial control. More specifically, this paper
demonstrates that an increased focus on budgeting during the planning process not only
reduces uncertainty and increases budget compliance, but also increases flexibility and
improves quality.
6.2 How do middle managers develop and use MCS?
Although the MCS initiated by top management can help reduce the consequences of
environmental uncertainty, it can also introduce new uncertainties and difficulties for lower-
level managers, especially when the demands conflict. Thus, managers actively engaged in
designing or adding techniques to local control systems or used components of the MSC. The
middle managers we interviewed were eager to comply with objectives and to implement the
strategies required of them, but they did not always have the control systems and tools
required. Moreover, neither the middle managers nor the employees were experienced in
developing control systems and integrating cost information into their work practice.
Consequently, they not only had to influence the MCS at higher managerial levels but also
had to rework the control systems (Deschamps, 2019) as well as develop reports and analyses
that could be used as part of the social work practice.
The challenge of balancing constraining and enabling controls was especially clear in
purchasing units, where a suggested rehabilitation approach included a highly intensive,
costly, short-term intervention. This helped clients become more self-reliant, eventually
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allowing them to live on their own, which ultimately is a low-cost solution. In these cases,
complying with measurable budget goals may be the first priority. As a consequence, the
client is referred to a less intensive rehabilitation service that may not be the best solution in
the long run. In sum, toomuch emphasis on diagnostic controls can inhibit the innovation and
learning needed to solve complex cases.
According to Simons (1995), top management ultimately decides how to best combine the
four levers of control. However, as argued by Frow et al. (2010), these decisions may cause
managers lower in the managerial hierarchy difficulties in managing the interplay and in
creating balance using levers, as found in Alpha. Even though Alpha’s management focused
on clarity (e.g. through elaborate planning), the lack of measurable goals made it difficult for
lower-level managers to reconcile these potentially conflicting objectives. This was especially
challenging because quality-related goals were less clear and difficult to measure compared
with measurable budget goals.
Simons (1995) and the literature on MCS tend to see interactions between top and middle
managements as processes initiated by top management and where middle management is
involved when it is considered relevant by top management. However, middle managers are
also expected to proactively identify new opportunities and challenges and to overcome
obstacles by mobilizing top management’s support (Kanter, 1981; Wooldridge et al., 2008).
The present paper showed that middle managers are generally proactive and that they not
only influence top management through formal communication channels but they also
initiate interactions that influence decision-making.
Middle managers have, as Reimer et al. (2016) remarked, case-specific knowledge.
Therefore, they can sensitively note relevant changes and devise suitable responses.
However, solutions by managers low in the hierarchy may be in conflict with MCS
constraints. Deschamps (2019) found that frontline managers in public sector organizations
prefer to use interactive controls and direct information. This study finds that this is the case
for middle managers, especially service provider managers.
In conclusion, the study confirms that middle managers play a crucial role in the
development and localization of MCS. In this process, middle managers not only adopt and
transform MCS but also proactively influence top management. However, this paper also
showed that theMCS deployed by topmanagement can cause challenges formiddlemanagers,
especially when they need to balance tight budget control and flexibility. Moreover, this paper
indicated that balancing constraining and enabling controls can differ between hierarchical
levels. Thus, an important conclusion is that the use of MCS elements, both vertically and
horizontally, should be taken into account when analyzing a MCS package.
6.3 How are locally developed MCS coupled with top management goals?
From the perspective of topmanagement, MCS can set directions and tightly control budgets.
However, because social services are often handled by managers who work closely with
service delivery (Dutton et al., 1997) and its inherent complexity, enabling control systems
may be required (Kominis and Dudau, 2012). Conflicting demands may lead to a looser
coupling between hierarchical levels, especially if external pressure is met with resistance
within the organization (Oliver, 1991). Consequently, MCS may be less effective as a strong
tight coupling between MCS employed at top-management level and those MCS employed at
lower hierarchical levels can be needed to enhance the realization of the organization’s
strategy (van der Kolk and Schokker, 2016).
Regarding Alpha, the middle managers’ daily controls were consistent with the top
management’s MCS intentions, while the vertical coupling of the MCS was tight. Keeping
managers focused on a balanced budget, a priority for middle managers, was achieved
without jeopardizing other important objectives such as fulfilling clients’ needs and providing
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quality care. This tight budget control, combined with the ability to carry over surplus and
deficit, budget reallocations, and additional funding under special circumstances, gave
managers the flexibility to provide quality social work and develop professional
competencies in daily operations.
In conclusion, a tight vertical coupling of budgeting and planning processes is possible,
even when environmental uncertainty and external pressure are high and local
circumstances call for flexibility. In the case of Alpha, the interactive use of budget and
planning systems facilitated the tight coupling. Thus, this finding is in linewith Bhimani et al.
(2018), who found that various budgeting strategies should be consideredwhen the couplings
within a MCS package are examined.
6.4 Limitations and future research recommendations
This paper focused on management control systems as “formal, information-based routines
and procedures managers use to maintain or alter patterns in organizational activities”
(Simons, 1995, p. 5) rather than as social processes and systems. Studies exploring
professional accountability in the context of New Public Management reforms, such as that
by Kurunm€aki (2004), demonstrated the challenge of influencing professional accountability
and creating amore cost-conscious approach in social services (Llewellyn, 1998). The present
paper indicates that MCS play an important role in shaping organizational members’
perceptions of changes by influencing their understanding of professionalism and the mental
models that guide social workers. Balogun and Johnson (2004) argued that middle managers
have the opportunity to shape and impose changes before they introduced them to the
organization. Moreover, by initiating sensegiving activities to trigger sensemaking
processes, middle managers can influence and shape organizational members’
interpretations the changes towards a preferred redefinition of organizational reality
(Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991).
Since sensemaking is a recursive social process (Weick, 1995), managers are influenced by
the environment in which they engage (Maitlis, 2005). Thus, the information derived from the
interactive use of MCS is important for making managers more proactive and changing
employees’ mindsets. However, future studies should focus on managers’ sensemaking and
sensegiving processes to better understand the interactions between control processes and
mindsets.
Due to the insufficient number of interviewees, it is difficult to conclude how personal
characteristics (e.g. sex, education, experience, etc.) influenced the use of the MCS in this
paper. Therefore, future research should utilize a larger sample of managers in order to
investigate how differentmanagers deal with various challenges in their daily operations and
how personal characteristics are relevant.
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